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ABSTRACT
All final year students in UTP are required to undertake a final year project (FYP)
paper, which are a design and/or research-based subject. It requires student to do
research; design and/or development work in each discipline, especially on real-
world problems which would motivate student to produce practical solutions. This
project title is "Study on Intrusion Detection System for a Campus Network". It is a
research and development work project. The objective of the project is to make sure
student do a research in the area that relevant with specified title. Beside, student
also needs to make a test bed application that is used in implementing the IDS. This
project scope will focus on implementing the IDS in campus network and how to
simulate the attacks besides measure it effectiveness in detecting any intrusion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and foremost, thank God for this opportunity and seeingme through sometruly
difficult times especially through the journey of completing this project. I would
like to express my warmest gratitude and appreciation to all parties who have
contributed towards the success of this Final Year Course Project.
I would like to express my appreciation especially to the following people:
• Mr. Abdullah Sani Abd. Rahman
Supervisor
• Mr. Mohammed Noor Ibrahim
IT/IS Final Year Project Coordinator
• Mrs. Vivian Yong Suet Peng
IT/IS Final Year Project Coordinator
Also my utmost gratitude goes to my family who help in many ways. Only Allah
may repay them.
This special thanks and appreciation also dedicated to all my colleagues and my
friends for their continued support, guidance and contribution to the success of this
Final Year Project. With the full cooperation from the various people above, I have





















Network Intrusion Detection System









Internet Control Message Protocol
in
ABOUT THIS DISSERTATION
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Consists the basic information of the project, comprises of its background, its
problem statement, its objectives andthe scope involved. This section also described
the project overview andthe significant ofthis project.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review
This chapter contains the acknowledgedfindings on this field, consisting of relevant
theories, hypothesis, facts and data which are relevant to the objective and the
research ofthisproject.
Chapter 3 - Methodology and Tools Used
This chapter features the detailed description of methodology and procedure of
completing thisproject. This methodology is implemented in orderto ensure that the
project is running as required. The tools that is used for this project also is
discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion
This chapter reports the product details andfindings, which supports the project
work The maindiscussion andfinding here is a discussion about the resultobtained
and the intrusion detectionsystem effectiveness.
Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Recommendation





Computer and networking technologies dominate much of our lives until today.
Many of us rely on these technologies everyday which all our works and
communications are enabled by these systems. Even as we rely on these systems,
we're painfullyawareof the flaws and imperfections in them.
In this network world, the needs for security and appropriate systems of control are
clear and the marching orders for those who would secure computer systems and
networks are ambitious indeed. The security achieved must be reasonable and
balance with the needs for privacy. It must be flexible enough to accommodate a
global range of statues and regulations besides consistent enough to track the
criminal across multiple jurisdictions.
The blend ofmanagement and technical measures isnecessary to meet these security
requirements, which is very complex. So, the area of audit and intrusion detection
has become an important part of computer and network security. The functions
provided by this technology serve the goals of security by providing trace back and
detection capabilities and also by monitoring the health and trustworthiness of other
security mechanism in the system.
1.1 Background of study
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer
system or network. It also inspects all inbound and outbound network activity and
identifies suspicious patterns that may indicate a network or system attack from
someone attempting to break into or compromise a system. This technology is
designed to monitor computer activities forthe purpose of finding security violations
which is varies from one organization to another organization. Intrusion detection
system spots malicious activity as it occurs and responds or alert the user
appropriately. Unfortunately accomplishing this full goal of intrusion detection is
not yet possible because networks are complex and the traffic and activities are
diverse besidesmost of the attacks are almost found daily. This situationrequires the
system to be updated frequently.
There are several ways to categorize an IDS:
1. Misuse Detection vs. Anomaly Detection
• In misuse detection, the IDS analyze the information it gathers and
compares it to large databases of attack signatures. Essentially, IDS is
looking for a specific attack that has already been documented. Like a
virus detection system, misuse detection software is only as good as the
database of attack signatures that it uses to compare packets against.
• In anomaly detection, the system administrator defines the baseline, or
normal, state of the network's traffic load, breakdown, protocol, and
typical packet size. The anomaly detector monitors network segments to
compare their state to the normal baseline and look for anomalies.
2. Network-based vs. Host-based systems
• In a network-based system, or NIDS, the individual packets flowing
through a network are analyzed. The NIDS can detect malicious packets
that are designed to be overlooked by a firewall's simplistic filtering
rules.
• In a host-based system, the IDS examines at the activity on each
individual computer or host.
3. Passive System vs. Reactive System
• In a passive system, the IDS detect a potential security breach, log the
information and signal an alert.
• In a reactive system, the IDS respond to the suspicious activity by
logging off a user or by reprogramming the firewall to block network
traffic from the suspected malicious source.
IDS attempts to detect unauthorized or malicious activities in a network or on a host
system based on signature based or anomaly based. Signature based allow IDS to
look for patterns that are known to be intrusive in packets or audit logs and anomaly
based allows ids to look for abnormal activity usually requires a template of normal
activity.
Though they both relate to network security, IDS is differs from a firewall in that a
firewall looks out for intrusions in order to stop them from happening but the IDS is
only detect them but do not stop them. The firewall limits the access between
networks in order to prevent intrusion and does not signal an attack from inside the
network while IDS evaluates a suspected intrusion once it has taken place and
signals analarm. IDS also watch for attacks that originate from within a system.
1.2 Problem Statement
1.2.1 Problem Identification
There were many complaints from the student about the performance of the network.
Most of them say that the network performance is slow and it affects their works
which require them to surf from the Internet. Network performance can become
slower when the transition rate is low or the connection bandwidth is less. This is
happen because many packets is transmitted in one time and each packet need to be
analyze before it is sendto the otherparty. During the packettransmission, some of
the packet sent may be dropped if the packet analyzer found some unknown
information in the packet. Then, there also some of the packet receiveddoesn't have
the information required and this packetmay send attacks to the network and it may
affect other data that is being transmitted.
In the network environment, there were various type of attacks occurs which will
affect the network performance such as malicious code, password crack, spoofing,
brute force attack, main-in-middle and others. Most of these attacks commonly come
from trusted network because the firewall that they used is only limit the access
between networks not the network inside. For example IP spoofing where the
intruder sends message to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message
is coming from the trusted network while the truth is not.
Nowadays there are many unknown attacks found in the network especially for
malicious code type. Most of attacks from this type are found everyday as new
comers where the detection system doesn't recognize it. These attacks may spread
out to other network area, which will be infected. Campus network currently used
firewall and also the anti virus software to patch any malicious code or other type of
attacks in the network. Even though they use firewall or antivirus for their
computers, the attack still can go into their computer because firewall only limit the
access between networks not the network inside.
1.2.2 Significant of the project
There were many types of attacks in the network nowadays that may cause our
system or our network not performs well. As there were many types of unknown
attacks, the writer has to come out with own rules that can detect any intrusion or
attacks that intrude trusted network. The rules are only detecting the unknown
packet but not prevent it from getting into the network.
From this research perhaps it will enhance the network effectiveness and minimize
the attackers' possibility to attack the computer or systems. It also hoped that the
writer could produce useful rules to prevent an intrusion in the network.
1.3 Objectives and Scope of Study
1.3.1 The objectives
• To identify thetype ofattacks that occurs incampus network
• To provide rules thatis used for intrusion detection system
• Produce a test bed environment to simulate the attacks
• To measure the effectiveness of IDS
1.3.2 Scope of study
The scope of study for this research project tends to focus on studying the intrusion
detection system concept and how it can manage the network management system.
Then, it also focuses on developing a framework that can improve the system to
detect the unknown attacks that intrude the network.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many IT organizations especially in tough economic times are trying to get more out
of what they already have and are asking vendors for more security functionality of
existing products that are already installed in their networks. Intrusion detection is a
type of network security that detects, identifies and isolates attempts to intrude or
make inappropriate use of computers.
Network intrusion can be simply broken into three areas which are Before the
Attack, During the Attack and After the Attack. It is very easy to break it down this
way but very hard to combat how someone might gain access to our network. If the
intrusions are performed for the purpose of gathering information or resource usage
rather than denial of service, the attacker will do everything in his or her power to
ensure that their presence is difficult to detect. This makes it even harder to detect
and trace what is happening within the network environment.
2.1 Before the Attack
Most of the companies work hard to take pro-active steps to prevent network
intrusions but they still happen and they still cause a lot of damage. However, if an
adversary spends enough investigatory time and has the appropriate technical
knowledge, they could get in if they are willing to work hard enough. As stated
previously, most of the network intrusions happen from inside the trusted network
completely bypassing the firewall. Most companies utilize a network based intrusion
detection system which is a distributed probe that monitors internal network
segments and looks for unauthorized traffic or requests.
A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) helps identify the fact that attacks may
be occurring. It is designed to detect, monitor and log potential security breaches.
Current network IDS products use a predominantly passive approach to collecting
data via protocol analysis garnered by watching traffic on the network. Each one
monitors the traffic on specific network segments. It gets copies of its segment's
traffic to inspect by "listening on promiscuous mode" and having its network
interface card bring in a copy of every packet it sees. It examines this packet and
attempts to determine whether they represent an intrusion attempt bycomparing it to
a list of known attack signatures. It does this by determining if the contents of the
packet contain the signature of a known attack method that is whether it contains a
stringof characters that matchesa specified patternor otherwise fits rules that define
known attack methods.
2.2 During an Attack
When someone is trying to attack or penetrate your network, it is commonly
understood that they are trying to access the data that is not for public. They try to
change or delete the company information, illegally use the server memory for their
own purposes and attempting to flood a particular device rendering it unusable to be
authorized users thereby creating a denial service attack.
Denial service attack is the common attack that can cause serious downtime. It looks
to send a tremendous amount of traffic via bogus server requests to your critical
servers. Your machine becomes overburdened and will be unable to respond to
normal requests. This is a very common attack to websites or key file servers. If
your machine is compromised, your machine's resources can be used in a denial of
service attack for anothertarget unbeknownst to you.
2.3 After the Attack
If an attack on your networkoccur, it is essential to do everything possible to ensure
that it can be detected and the traffic can be captured and analyzed. After you
identify that you are under attack or have been attacked, you cannot go back and
collect necessary raw network traffic to piece together what happened. The only
avenue at this point is to access log files of the critical machine hit in the attack,
provided you had the highest detailed logging turned on. Even with this information,
you could still be missing critical data. It is like trying to complete a jigsaw puzzle
without knowing the number of pieces available and how many are you missing.
You may not be able to understand what the picture even looks like.
2.4 Security Test Areas
A security test is performed with two types of attack which are passive attack and
intrusive attack. A passive attack is often a form of data collection which does not
directly influence or trespass upon the target system or network. An intrusive attack
however does not trespass upon target system or network and can be logged and
used to alarm the target system or network. The process of a security test
concentrates on evaluating the visibility, access, trust and alarm. All of this area is
concerned because it may give bad effect on network performance where it may
cause the network traffic become jammed.
2.5 Packet Sniffing
Sniffing program has been around for a long time in two forms which are
commercial packet sniffers and underground packet sniffers. Each of them is used to
help maintaining the networks and also is used to break intocomputers. In theory, it
is impossible to detect sniffing programs because they are passive. They only collect
packets but do not transmit anything. However, in practice it is sometimes possible
to detect sniffingprograms. A stand alone packet sniffer doesn't transmit any packet
but when installed non-stand alone in a normal computer, the sniffing program will
often generate traffic such as it might send out DNS reverse lookups in order to find
names associated with IP address.
2.6 Brief Description of SNORT
Snort is the product of Marty Roesch's mission to create an open source, lightweight
NIDS. His product become wildly popular and now is deployed at countless
organizations from small homes to large universities. While not designed
specifically for a high-bandwidth environment, Snort performs well even at high
traffic ingestion rates because it uses a simple but fast decoder and detection engine.
The basic Snort architecture is made up of three main parts which are the packet
decoder, detection engine and thealerting and logging system. The packet decoder is
based on libpcap and can collect TCP/IP traffic at a blinding rate. The packetdata is
decoded layer by layer up trough the OSI model until it is passed to the detection
engine.
Before the engine can compare any of the signatures in its database to the packets,
the packets data is passed trough a number of userconfigurable preprocessors. Then,
if any signature is match withthe signature in database, the third part of Snort which
is alert/log system will take the action prescribed. If configured, Snort will also
capture the packet data relating to the alert and store it on the hard drive. The alert
system will publish alerts to an area on the file system for the intrusion analyst to
examine or to a remote analysis through standard remote log formats like syslog or
smb messages.
Overall, all the literature review that I read before tell me about the definition,
concept, analysis schemes and how to understand the network traffic which is very
complicated and difficult to understand. It may take much time in order to
understand the traffic clearly.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT WORK
Project methodology refers to the framework that is used to structure, plan and
control the process of intrusion detection system in the campus network. Creating
the rules for intrusion detection system involve reusability with open source
technology however limited knowledge about the existed open source acquire me to
have further reference about its usability and its functions. Lack of technical
capability and interdependences of various programming language and technology
requires ongoing internal testing and peer review of the different module compliant
to project scope.
In completing this project, I have used five steps or five phasesthat helps me to plan
and control the intrusion detection system. As to start my project, I had reviewed
about intrusion detection system in order to give me a clear view about intrusion
detection system and to help me narrow down the project scope. As intrusion
detection system function is for detecting any intrusion in the network, so the next
step is to identify the famous attack in network campus environment. When the
famous attacks type is identified, it willacquire us to findwayson how to detect that
attacks if it is exist in our network. In this case, we need to know its signatures and
then, we can detect it by analyzing the packet sent and packet received.
Next step is to setup the intrusion detection system in the campus network
environment. I have downloaded one of open source software from the Internet for
my IDS. The open source software that I use is Snort where it has some rules to
detect an intrusion in the network. This rules is created based on the attacks
signature and if the signature in the packet is suit or match with the specified
signature, then it will display an alert message that tell us what and where it is
happen. In order to setup the IDS, I run the IDS on my PC which is connected to the
others who are in the same area with me. Then, IDS will analyze the packet that is
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sent through the network and it will store it in the log files. If there were an alert for
the packet sent, then it will be stored in the alert.ids files in bin folder. Here is the
view of some PCs that existed in this network:
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Figure 1: Network View
As I apply Snort for my IDS, so there were some configuration that need to be done
according to the network environment where we need to specify the internal and
external network addresses.
Fourth step in this project is to simulate the attacks in the network. In this step, I
need to simulate the attacks in the network and understand on how it happens and
what it is all about. Then, the last step for this project is to measure the effectiveness
of the IDS. In order to measure it effectiveness, I will try to make a simple
application that can send attack randomly and then IDS will detect it according to
the signature pattern in the packet. The efficiency of the IDS needs to be measure
becauseIDS may send false positive alert to the user or to the network administrator.
So, this simple application is used to ensure that the attack that is sent into the
network is detected by the IDS. Then, the attack that is sent into the network will be
stored in the log files for further references and it also will be used to compare with
the Snort log files.
After IDS is run, I have some results that need to be analyzed. This result contains
the information from where and to where the data is transferred and it also shows on
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which protocol that person used to transfer the data. The result gain needs to be
analyzed carefullybecause it may send false positive alert to the administrator.
In order to completethis project, it may require some tools that will be used in order
to setup network with IDS and it also will help me in understanding the concept
besides teach me something new about IDS. Some tools that I used in completing
this project are:
• Personal Computer
• Open Source Software - Snort
• Network Tools - such as network card, network cable, router or switches
3.1 Types of Network Attack
Nowadays, there were various type of attacks occurs in the network environment.
Attacks generally can be categorized in two areas which are passive and active. A
passive attack usually aimed at gaining access to penetrate the system without
compromising IT resources while an active attack results in an unauthorized state
change of IT resources. Most of attacks is coming from own enterprise's employees
or their business partners or customers which are internal or inside the network. If
the attacks is coming from outside or external which frequently via Internet, firewall
can help us to detect it because most of firewall used is designed to detect any
unauthorized activities from network outside.
Most of attack is not a single action but it is a series of individual events that is
developed in a coordinated manner. Here are some types of attacks that occur in the
network:
• Password cracking
It is an action that has been done to crack our password for any application
we used without our permission. The password can be cracked by using the
password cracker. A password cracker is an application program that is used
to identify an unknown or forgotten password to a computer or network
resources. It can also be used to help a human cracker obtain unauthorized
12
access to resources. Password crackers use two primary methods to identify
correct passwords which are brute-force and dictionary searches. When a
password cracker uses brute-force, it runs through combinations of
characters within a predetermined length until it finds the combination
accepted by the computer system. When conducting a dictionary search, a
password cracker searches each word in the dictionary for the correct
password. Password dictionaries exist for a variety of topics and
combinations of topics, including politics, movies, and music groups. Some
password cracker programs search for hybrids of dictionary entries and
numbers. For example, a password cracker may search for antsOl; ants02;
ants03, etc. This can be helpful where users have been advised to include a
number in their password. A password cracker may also be able to identify
encrypted passwords. After retrieving the password from the computer's
memory, the program may be able to decrypt it. Or, by using the same
algorithm as the system program, the password cracker creates an encrypted
version of the password that matches the original.
Malicious code such as virus, worms
The two most common types of malicious code attacks are the virus and the
worm. A virus is a program used to infect a computer. It is usually buried
inside another program known as a Trojan or distributed as a stand-alone
executable. Not all viruses are malicious in fact it is very few that cause
extensive damage to systems. Most viruses are simply practical jokes,
designed to make it appear, or scare recipients into thinking, that something
is wrong with Windows. Unfortunately, the viruses that are destructive are
often extremely destructive. A well-designed virus can disable an entire
network in a matter of minutes. Worms are often confused with viruses, but
they are very different types of code. A worm is self-replicating code that
spreads itself from system to system. A traditional virus requires manual
intervention to propagate itself, by copying it unknowingly to a floppy,
unwittingly embedding it in an attachment, or some other method. Worms do
not require assistance to spread because a worm can automatically e-mail
itself to other users, copy itself through the network, or even scan other hosts
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for vulnerabilities and then attack those hosts. A worm resides in active
memory where the program is executed, itwill do what it is going todo, and
propagates itself. A virus typically overwrites, or attaches itself to, system
files. The distinction is often difficult to follow. It is not uncommon for a
virus tobe paired with a worm prior to launch. The virus does its job, and the
worm transports the virus to the next group of victims. Worms have become
much more dangerous with the advent of application integration. Many
worms take advantage ofcode that allows programs to automatically execute
code to automate common office tasks. E-mail applications are often
especially vulnerable to worms. Sometimes worms are sent as attachments
thatexecute when a user attempts to open them, butmore often themalicious
code can be executed simply by previewing the message, without even
reading the message.
Man in the middle attacks
Men in the middle attacks are much more onerous. Here, the attacker
intercepts traffic heading between two devices on the network. The attacker
can either monitor information or alter the data as it passes through the
network. Typically a man in the middle attack works like this: An attacker
sits on the network and watches traffic. When another user on the network
sends an ARP request to a network device, the attacker sends a response
saying the compromised machine is the requested device. Even if the actual
device responds, the second response will override the first. The user now
sends alldata destined for the original device to the compromised machine. It
is possible for an attacker to use this method to intercept enough data to
effectively monitor and log all network traffic and gain important
information such as usernames and passwords. Users may never know that
the traffic is being intercepted, because each packet will eventually be
forwarded onto its intended destination.
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Spoofing
An IP spoofing attack is one in which the source IP address of a packet is
forged. There are generally two types of spoofing attacks: IP spoofing used
in DoS attacks and man in the middle attacks. IP spoofing-based DoS attacks
are relatively straightforward. An attacker sends a packet to the target host
with a forged IP address (SYN)—often an IP address in the RFC 1918
address space, though it does not have to be. The targeted host sends an
acknowledgement (ACK) and waits for a response. The response never
comes, and these unanswered queries remain in the buffer of the targeted
device. If enough spoofed queries are sent, the buffer will overflow and the
network device will become unstable and crash.
Brute force attack
It is a type of password attack that does not attempt to decrypt any
information but simply continue to try different passwords. For example a
brute-force attack may have a dictionary of all words and/or a listing of
commonly used passwords. To gain access to the account usinga brute-force
attack the program would try all the available words it has to gain access to
the account. Another type of brute-force attack is a program that runs
through all letters and/or letters andnumbers until it gets a match. Although
a brute-force attack may be able to gain access to an account eventually,
these types of attacks cantake several hours, days, months, andeven years to
run. The amount of time it takes to complete these attacks is dependent on
how complicated the password is. So it is advice to all users to change their
password frequently in order to avoid this attack.
Scanning ports and services
It includes ICMP scanning, UDP, and TCP Stealth Scanning. Prior to
sniffing a network an attacker has to gain access. Attackers gain access by
scanning devices on the network for vulnerabilities, then exploiting them.
Port scanning can either be targeted or random. An attacker interested in a
particular network will attempt to track down information about that network
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and scan for vulnerabilities. Alternatively, attackers will put large net blocks
into a port scanner and let it run for days, trying to find any machine that is
available and able to be exploited. This highlights the difference between an
attacker and script kiddies.
3.2 IDS Architecture
As to setup my IDS in the network, I have design its architecture based on
thenetwork. I have installed Snort inworkstation no.5 (WS5) in the network,
then the IDS will examine the packet that is sent or received trough the
network.




Snort can be run in various modes from simply dumping sniffed traffic to the screen
where it is able to compare the network traffic with a pre-configured set of
signatures known as rules that are house in one or more files. Snort is typically run
on command line whether it is run on Windows or Unix host. The most common
practical command line options that has been used is -c snort.conf where it allows
user place snort in NIDS mode by informing it of the configuration file to be used.
The writer must customize this file for her site where this file is provided in the
Snort download directory.
Snort allows action to be assigned to each rule, indicating what to do when the rule
is triggered. Here is an example of a Snort file entry:
[**] iMMAP TCP ping [**]
03/12-13:33.51:880120 1.2.3.4:1029 -> 192.168.5.5:80
TCP TTL:46 TOS:0x0 ID:19678
******A* Seq . oxE4F00003 Ack: 0x0 Win: OxCOO
There is identifying message associated with the alert that the user can assign when
the rule is created or inform the analyst of the perceiving problem. The message for
the preceding alert is "NMAP TCP ping". Next is the date and timestamp followed
by IP address and port number. The arrow is the direction of traffic where it shows
the source is at left and the destination is on the right where the IP address and port
number is already specified after the arrow. The third line indicates that the traffic is
TCP, which has an arriving time-to-live (46), type of service value (0) and IP
identification number (19678). In the final line, it list the TCP flag set. 'A' signifies
that the acknowledgement flag is set followed by hexadecimal representation of TCP
sequence number, the acknowledgement number and the TCP window size. All of
these fields can providemore detailsaboutthe packetthat trigger the alert.
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This alert appears because there is a rule examines TCP segments with an
acknowledgement flag setbut an accompanying acknowledgement value of 0.Most
of the time, when this is observed, it is telltale sign of nmap attempting to discover
live host. If the acknowledgement is allowed to reach the destination host, the host
should respond to the unsolicited acknowledgement with a reset, regardless of
whether the port is listening or not. That iswhy the message accompanying the alert
is "NMAP TCP ping".
Snort supports both header and payload inspection methods, which allow you to
fully specify ina single rule. There are many but the most important is the capability
to inspect and alter signatures. If the analyst can examine the signatures and the
packet that caused alert, there is a better chance to make a more accurate assessment.
Additionally, signatures that allow an analyst to look at any field from different
perspectives potentially improve the quality of IDS. In other words, it only allow
writer to create rules that inspect packets for a given IP, port or protocol however it
lacks the range to examine payloads or header fields on more granular level.
Benefit that we can gainby using Snort is it comes in a large set of rules. But then it
is not recommended to use all the rules on installation because the more active rules
used, the network traffic inspection becomes slower. So, I need to decide which
rulesare appropriate for a campus network depend of the typesof attack that occur.
The Snort format for defining packet signatures is now a de-facto standard for
publishing signatures. A rules file in Snort is constructed by collecting together a set
of rules that are applicable for a particular site. Simply collecting together the
thousands of Snort rules that have been defined is not a good strategy. Many of the
rules will generate false alert, reduce the network performance where the network
bandwidth will become slower and it also will reduce the value of the monitoring
system. In addition, the Snort application is designed to operate in the position of the
firewall, examining all the traffic on and off site in order to prevent unauthorized
access from outside. In this project, I assume that there is a firewall in place and my
job is to identifywhere the localhosts become compromised.
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Most of the rules files which is located in rules folder is triggering the packet from
external network rather than internal network. Both of internal and external network
have been define in the configuration files where the external network means the





Intrusion detection systems have generated a great deal of attention in the security
world. They present a vision of an ever-vigilant system sentinel, equipped with the
capability to assimilate quantities of information generated by complex system.
Intrusion detection systems allow users to optimize the penetrate-and-patch process
by sharing penetration knowledge between sites. Many users acknowledge that
penetrate and patch is not an optimal solution to system security problems.
However, it is the only available option for the user to perform secure design. In
addition, the event monitoring and attack recognition capabilities of intrusion
detection system enhance the security of a system in other ways. First, these
capabilities have a significant deterrent effect on attackers and it also can deal with
insider threat. Second, automated responses can disrupt some attacks at the outset
making the subsequent attacks more difficult to stage. Third, monitoring the
operation of the rest of the security infrastructure allows system security managers
to see when security protections are not functioning properly and to rectify the
situation before an attacker exploits. And finally, the information gained by
monitoring the system can sometimes make it easier to manage the system in other
ways, which will result in greater system reliability.
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# Configure your server lists. This allows snort to only look for
#attacks to systems that have a service up. Why look for HTTP
#attacks if you are not running a web server? This allows quick
#filtering based on IP addresses
# These configurations MUST follow the same configuration scheme as
#defined above for $HOME_NET.
# List of DNS servers on your network
var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of SMTP servers on your network
var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of web servers on your network
var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of sql servers on your network
var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of telnet servers on your network
var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of snmp servers on your network
var SNMP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# Configure your service ports. This allows snort to look for
iattacks destined to a specific application only on the ports that
#application runs on. For example, if you run a web server on port
#8081, set your HTTP^PORTS variable like this:
#
# var HTTP_PORTS 8081
#
# Port lists must either be continuous [eg 80:8080], or a single
#port [eg 80].
# We will adding support for a real list of ports in the future.
# Ports you run web servers on
#
# Please note: [80,8080] does not work.
# If you wish to define multiple HTTP ports,
#
# var HTTP_PORTS 80
# include somefile.rules
# var HTTP_PORTS 8080
# include somefile.rules
var HTTP_PORTS 80
# Ports you want to look for 5HELLCODE on.
var SHELLCODE_PORTS !80




# AIM servers. AOL has a habit of adding new AIM servers, so
#instead of modifying the signatures when they do, we add them to





# Path to your rules files (this can be a relative path)
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute
#path,
# such as: c:\snort\rules
var RULE_PATH c:\snort\rules
# Configure the snort decoder
#
# Snort's decoder will alert on lots of things such as header
















# Stop Alerts on T/TCP alerts
#
# In snort 2.0.1 and above, this only alerts when a TCP option is
#detected that shows T/TCP being actively used on the network. If








# Stop Alerts on invalid ip options
#
# config disable_ipopt_alerts
# Configure the detection engine
# ===============================
#
# Use a different pattern matcher in case you have a machine with
#very limited resources:
#
# config detection: search-method lowmem
###################################################
# Step #2: Configure preprocessors
#
# General configuration for preprocessors is of
# the form
# preprocessor <name of processors Configuration options>
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# Configure Flow tracking module
#
#
# The Flow tracking module is meant to start unifying the state
#keeping mechanisms of snort into a single place. Right now, only a
#portscan detector is implemented but in the long term, many of the
#stateful subsystems of snort will be migrated over to becoming flow
#plugins. This must be enabled for flow-portscan to work correctly.
#
# See README.flow for additional information
#
preprocessor flow: stats_interval 0 hash 2
# frag2: IP defragmentation support
#
# This preprocessor performs IP defragmentation. This plugin will
#also detect people launching fragmentation attacks (usually DoS)
#against hosts. No arguments loads the default configuration of the
#preprocessor, which is a 60 second timeout and a 4MB fragment
#buffer.
# The following (comma delimited) options are available for frag2
# timeout [seconds] - sets the number of [seconds] that
#unfinished fragment will be kept around waiting for completion,
#if this time expires the fragment will be flushed
# memcap [bytes] - limit frag2 memory usage to [number] bytes
# (default: 4194304)
#
# min_ttl [number] - minimum ttl to accept
#
# ttl_limit [number] - difference of ttl to accept without
#alerting will cause false positves with router flap
#
# Frag2 uses Generator ID 113 and uses the following SIDS
# for that GID:
# SID Event description
1 Oversized fragment (reassembled frag > 64k bytes;
2 Teardrop-type attack
an
# stream4: stateful inspection/stream reassembly for Snort
#
# Use in concert with the -z [all|est] command line switch to defeat
#stick/snot against TCP rules. Also performs full TCP stream
#reassembly, stateful inspection of TCP streams, etc. Can
#statefully detect various portscan types, fingerprinting, ECN, etc.
# stateful inspection directive
# no arguments loads the defaults (timeout 30, memcap 8388608)
# options (options are comma delimited):
# detect__scans - stream4 will detect stealth portscans and generate
#alerts when it sees them when this option is set
#detect_state_problems - detect TCP state problems, this tends to be








# min_ttl [number] - set a minium ttl that snort will accept
#to stream reassembly
#
# ttl_limit [number] - differential of the initial ttl on a
#session versus the normal that someone may be playing games.
# Routing flap may cause lots of false positives.
#
# keepstats [machine]binary] - keep session statistics, add
#"machine" to get them in a flat format for machine reading, add
#"binary" to get them in a unified binary output
# format
#noinspect - turn off stateful inspection only timeout [number] -
#set the session timeout counter to [number] seconds,
#default is 30 seconds
# memcap [number] - limit stream4 memory usage to [number] bytes
# log_flushed_streams - if an event is detected on a stream this
#option will cause all packets that are stored in the stream4
#packet buffers to be flushed to disk. This only works when logging
#in pcap mode!
#
# Stream4 uses Generator ID 111 and uses the following SIDS
# for that GID:


















Evasive TCP packet retransmission
TCP Window violation
Data on SYN packet
Stealth scan: full XMAS
Stealth scan: SYN-ACK-PSH-URG
Stealth scan: FIN scan
Stealth scan: NULL scan
Stealth scan: NMAP XMAS scan
Stealth scan: Vecna scan
Stealth scan: NMAP fingerprint scan stateful detect
Stealth scan: SYN-FIN scan
TCP forward overlap
preprocessor stream4: detect_scans, detect_state_problems,ttl_limit
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# tcp stream reassembly directive
# no arguments loads the default configuration
# Only reassemble the client,
# Only reassemble the default list of ports (See below),
# Give alerts for "bad" streams
#
# Available options (comma delimited):
# clientonly - reassemble traffic for the client side of a
#connection only
# serveronly - reassemble traffic for the server side of a
#connection only
# both - reassemble both sides of a session
# noalerts - turn off alerts from the stream reassembly stage of
#stream4
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# ports [list] - use the space separated list of ports in [list],
#"all"
# will turn on reassembly for all ports, "default"
#will turn




# http_inspect: normalize and detect HTTP traffic and protocol
#anomalies
#
# lots of options available here. See doc/README.http_inspect.
# Unicode.map should be wherever your snort.conf lives, or given
# a full path to where snort can find it.
preprocessor http_inspect: global iis_unicode_map Unicode.map 1252
preprocessor http_inspect_server: server default \
profile all ports { 80 8080 8180 } oversize_dir_length 500
#
# Example unqiue server configuration
#
#preprocessor http_inspect__server: server 1.1.1.1 \
# ports { 80 3128 8080 } \
# flow_depth 0 \
# ascii no \
# double_decode yes \
# non_rfc_char { 0x00 } \
# chunk_length 500000 \
# non_strict \
# oversize_dir_length 300 \
# no alerts
# rpc_decode: normalize RPC traffic
#
# RPC may be sent in alternate encodings besides the usual 4-byte
#encoding
# that is used by default. This plugin takes the port numbers that
#RPC
# services are running on as arguments - it is assumed that the
igiven ports
# are actually running this type of service. If not, change the
#ports or turn
# it off.
# The RPC decode preprocessor uses generator ID 106
#
# arguments: space separated list
# alert_fragments - alert on any rpc fragmented TCP data
# no_alert_multiple__requests - don't alert when >1 rpc query is in a
#packet
# no_alert_large_fragments - don't alert when the fragmented
# sizes exceed the current packet size
# no_alert_incomplete - don't alert when a single segment
# exceeds the current packet size
preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 32771
# bo: Back Orifice detector
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## Detects Back Orifice traffic on the network. Takes no arguments
#in 2.0.
#
# The Back Orifice detector uses Generator ID 105 and uses the
# following SIDS for that GID:
# SID Event description
#
# 1 Back Orifice traffic detected
preprocessor bo
# telnet^decode: Telnet negotiation string normalizer
#
# This preprocessor "normalizes" telnet negotiation strings from
#telnet and ftp
# traffic. It works in much the same way as the http_decode
#preprocessor,
# searching for traffic that breaks up the normal data stream of a
#protocol and
# replacing it with a normalized representation of that traffic so
#that the
# "content" pattern matching keyword can work without requiring
#modifications.
# This preprocessor requires no arguments.
# Portscan uses Generator ID 109 and does not generate any SID
#currently.
preprocessor telnet_decode
# Flow-Portscan: detect a variety of portscans
#




# This module detects portscans based off of flow creation in the
#flow
# preprocessors. The goal is to catch one->many hosts and one->many
# ports scans.
#
# Flow-Portscan has numerous options available, please read
# README.flow-portscan for help configuring this option.
# Flow-Portscan uses Generator ID 121 and uses the following SIDS
#for that GID:
# SID Event description
#
# 1 flow-portscan: Fixed Scale Scanner Limit Exceeded
# 2 flow-portscan: Sliding Scale Scanner Limit Exceeded
# 3 flow-portscan: Fixed Scale Talker Limit Exceeded
# 4 flow-portscan: Sliding Scale Talker Limit Exceeded
# preprocessor flow-portscan: \
# talker-sliding-scale-factor 0.50 \
# talker-fixed-threshold 30 \
# talker-sliding-threshold 30 \
# talker-sliding-window 20 \
# talker-fixed-window 30 \
# scoreboard-rows-talker 30000 \
# server-watchnet [10.2.0.0/30] \
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# server-ignore-limit 200 \
# server-rows 65535 \
# server-learning-time 14400 \
# server-scanner-limit 4 \
# scanner-sliding-window 20 \
# scanner-sliding-scale-factor 0.50 \
# scanner-fixed-threshold 15 \
# scanner-sliding-threshold 40 \
# scanner-fixed-window 15 \
# scoreboard-rows-scanner 30000 \
# src-ignore-net [192.168.1.1/32,192.168.0.0/24] \
# dst-ignore-net [10.0.0.0/30] \
# alert-mode once \




# Experimental ARP detection code from Jeff Nathan, detects ARP
#attacks,
# unicast ARP requests, and specific ARP mapping monitoring. To
#make use of
# this preprocessor you must specify the IP and hardware address of
#hosts on
# the same layer 2 segment as you. Specify one host IP MAC combo
#per line.
# Also takes a "-unicast" option to turn on unicast ARP request
#detection.




Etherframe ARP mismatch (src)
Etherframe ARP mismatch (dst)
ARP cache overwrite attack
#preprocessor arpspoof
ttpreprocessor arpspoof_detect_host: 192.168.40.1 f0:0f:00:f0:0f:00









# Documentation for this is provided in the Snort Manual. You
#should read it.
# It is included in the release distribution as doc/snort_manual.pdf
#
# preprocessor perfmonitor: time 300 file /var/snort/snort.stats
#pktcnt 10000
####################################################################
# Step #3: Configure output plugins
#
# Uncomment and configure the output plugins you decide to use.
#General
# configuration for output plugins is of the form:
#
# output <name_of_plugin>: <configuration_options>
#
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# alert_syslog: log alerts to syslog
#
# Use one or more syslog facilities as arguments. Win32 can also
#optionally
# specify a particular hostname/port. Under Win32, the default
#hostname is
# '127.0.0.1', and the default port is 514.
#
# [Unix flavours should use this format...]
# output alert_syslog: L0G_AUTH LOG_ALERT
#
# [Win32 can use any of these formats...]
# output alert_syslog: L0G_AUTH LOG__ALERT
# output alert_syslog: host=hostname, LOG_AUTH LOG_ALERT
# output alert_syslog: host=hostname:port, LOG_AUTH LOG_ALERT
# log__tcpdump: log packets in binary tcpdump format
#
# The only argument is the output file name.
#
output log_tcpdump: snort.log
# database: log to a variety of databases
#
# See the README, database file for more information about
tconfiguring
# and using this plugin.
#
# output database: log, mysql, user=root password=test dbname=db
#host=localhost
# output database: alert, postgresql, user=snort dbname=snort
# output database: log, odbc, user=snort dbname=snort
# output database: log, mssql, dbname=snort user=snort password=test
# output database: log, oracle, dbname-snort user^snort
#password=test
# unified: Snort unified binary format alerting and logging
#
# The unified output plugin provides two new formats for logging and
#generating
# alerts from Snort, the "unified" format. The unified format is a
#straight
# binary format for logging data out of Snort that is designed to be
#fast and
# efficient. Used with barnyard (the new alert/log processor), most
#of the
# overhead for logging and alerting to various slow storage
#mechanisms such as
# databases or the network can now be avoided.
#
# Check out the spo_unified.h file for the data formats.
#
# Two arguments are supported.
# filename - base filename to write to (current time t is
#appended)
# limit - maximum size of spool file in MB (default: 128)
#
# output alert_unified: filename snort.alert, limit 128
# output log_unified: filename snort.log, limit 128
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# You can optionally define new rule types and associate one or more
#output
# plugins specifically to that type.
#




# output log_tcpdump: suspicious.log
# }
#
# EXAMPLE RULE FOR SUSPICIOUS RULETYPE:
# suspicious tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 6667 (msg:"Internal IRC
#Server";)
#






# output alert_syslog: LOG_AUTH LOG_ALERT




# EXAMPLE RULE FOR REDALERT RULETYPE:
# redalert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 31337 \
# (msg:"Someone is being LEET"; flags:A+;)
#
# Include classification & priority settings
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute
#path,






# Include reference systems
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute
#path,
# such as: c:\snort\etc\reference.config
#




# Step #4: Customize your rule set
#
# Up to date snort rules are available at http://www.snort.org
#





# The rules included with this distribution generate alerts based on
Ion
# suspicious activity. Depending on your network environment, your
#security
# policies, and what you consider to be suspicious, some of these
#rules may
# either generate false positives ore may be detecting activity you
#consider to
# be acceptable; therefore, you are encouraged to comment out rules
#that are
# not applicable in your environment.
#
# The following individuals contributed many of rules in this
#distribution.
#
# Include all relevant rulesets here
#
# The following rulesets are disabled by default:
#
# web-attacks, backdoor, shellcode, policy, porn, info, icmp-info,
#virus,
# chat, multimedia, and p2p
#
# These rules are either site policy specific or require tuning in
#order to not
# generate false positive alerts in most environments.
#
# Please read the specific include file for more information and




















































# Include any thresholding or suppression commands. See
#threshold.conf in the
# <snort src>/etc directory for details. Commands don't necessarily
#need to be
# contained in this conf, but a separate conf makes it easier to
#maintain them.
# Note for Windows users: You are advised to make this an absolute
#path,
# such as: c:\snort\etc\threshold.conf
# Uncomment if needed.
# include threshold.conf
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Appendix 2 : Snort Command Utilities
USAGE: snort [-options] <filter options>




-A Set alert mode: fast, full, console, or none (alert file alerts only)
-b Log packets in tcpdump format (muchfaster!)
-c <rules> Use Rules File <rules>
-C Print out payloads with character data only (no hex)
-d Dump the Application Layer
-e Display the second layer header info
-E Log alert messages to NTEventlog. (Win32 only)
-f Turn off fflushQ calls after binary log writes
-F <bpf> Read BPF filters from file <bp&>
-h <hn> Home network = <hn>
-i <if> Listen on interface <if>
-I Add Interface name to alert output
-k <mode> Checksum mode (all,noip,notcp,noudp,noicmp,none)
-I <ld> Log to directory <ld>
-L <file> Log to this tcpdump file
-n <cnt> Exit after receiving <cnt> packets
-N Turn off logging (alerts still work)
-o Change the rule testing order to Pass|Alert|Log
-O Obfuscate the logged IP addresses
-p Disable promiscuous mode sniffing
-P <snap> Set explicit snaplen of packet (default: 1514)
-q Quiet. Don't show bannerand status report
-r <tf> Read and process tcpdump file <tf>
-R <id> Include 'id' in snort_intf<id>.pid file name
-s Logalertmessages to syslog
-S <n=v> Set rules file variable n equal to value v
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-T Test and report on the current Snort configuration
-U Use UTC for timestamps
-v Be verbose
-V Show version number
-W Lists available interfaces. (Win32 only)
-w Dump 802.11 management and control frames
-X Dump the raw packet data starting at the link layer
-y Include year in timestamp in the alert and log files
-z Set assurance mode, match on established sesions (for TCP)
-? Show this information
<Filter Options> are standard BPF options, as seen in TCPDump
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